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Abstract
We explore and compare a variety of definitions for privacy and disclosure limitation in
statistical estimation and data analysis, including (approximate) differential privacy, testing-
based definitions of privacy, and posterior guarantees on disclosure risk. We give equivalence
results between the definitions, shedding light on the relationships between different formalisms
for privacy. We also take an inferential perspective, where—building off of these definitions—
we provide minimax risk bounds for several estimation problems, including mean estimation,
estimation of the support of a distribution, and nonparametric density estimation. These bounds
highlight the statistical consequences of different definitions of privacy and provide a second lens
for evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of different techniques for disclosure limitation.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study several definitions of privacy—formalisms for limiting disclosure in statistical
procedures—and their consequences in terms of achievable (statistical) risk for estimation and data
analysis. We review (and present a few new) definitions that attempt to capture what, intuitively,
it should mean to limit disclosures from the output of an inferential task. We focus on several
potential definitions for a strong type of disclosure limitation, where an adversary attempts to glean
information from data released; in particular, notions of privacy centering around differential privacy
(and its relaxations) as formulated by Dwork et al. [13, 12]. As a motivation for the definitions we
study, consider a gene association study with a known list of subjects; we focus on guarantees such
that even if the adversary knows the disease status (case or control) of many of the subjects in the
study, he is not able to easily identify the disease status of remaining subjects. Differential privacy
is designed for precisely this setting.
To protect against such an incident, we allow adversaries that are (1) computationally unbounded
and (2) may have access to all elements of a sample {X1, . . . ,Xn} except for a single unknown
observation Xi; the estimators we compute must not release too much information about this last
observation. While such definitions seem quite strong, they have motivated a body of work in the
cryptography, database, and theoretical computer science communities, beginning with the work of
Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [13] on differential privacy (see also the papers [11, 28, 5, 15]).
It has been quite challenging to give rigorous definitions of privacy against weaker adversaries (such
definitions have often been shown [13, 12] to have fatal flaws), but subsequent works have broadened
our understanding of acceptable privacy definitions and adversaries [20, 21, 2].
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Our goal in this paper is to make more precise the relationship between privacy constraints and
statistical estimation. Thus, in addition to presenting a variety of definitions, we provide comparison
by focusing on their consequences for estimation: specifically, we ask whether there are substantive
differences between minimax error for estimating parameters of a variety of distributions under
different definitions of privacy. We show that, in fact, there are strong commonalities; focusing on
mean estimation to be explicit, we find the minimax mean squared error of estimators under different
privacy constraints is often very similar for seemingly different definitions of privacy. Nonetheless,
some definitions allow more favorable dependence on dimension than standard (differential) privacy
definitions, though at the expense of some security.
As a consequence of our focus on definitional aspects of privacy and their effects on statistical
estimation and inference problems, we study estimation of population quantities. That is, we observe
a sample Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, drawn from an unknown distribution P , and we wish to make inferences
about some parameter θ(P ) of the data generating distribution P rather than reporting aspects
of the sample itself. This focus is different from much of the work on optimality guarantees in
private data analysis [16, 6, 26], though there have been a few authors who have studied population
quantities (for example, Beimel and colleagues [4, 3] in the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC)
model for concept learning). For more discussion on the issue of population estimation in private
settings, see the discussion of Duchi et al. [9].
In Section 2, we enumerate a set of potential definitions of privacy under our adversarial model;
these include differential privacy, approximate differential privacy, a strengthened form of differen-
tial privacy, and several testing-based definitions of privacy. We follow this in Section 3 by providing
minimax lower bounds for population estimation of mean parameters, distributional support esti-
mation, and density estimation. As a concrete example, we consider the problem of estimating
the mean of a d-dimensional random variable X ∈ Rd distributed according to a distribution P ,
given a sample consisting of n i.i.d. draws X1, . . . ,Xn
iid∼ P . This clearly shows characteristic effects
of dimensionality and moment assumptions—for instance, bounds on higher moments of X, i.e.
E[‖X‖k2 ] < ∞ for some fixed k > 1—on the best possible rates of private estimation. Section 4
presents concrete estimation strategies achieving the minimax lower bounds on mean estimation
presented in Section 3 under our different prvacy definitions. We will see that our definitions of
privacy yield minimax optimal procedures with nearly the same (asymptotic) dependence on the
number k of moments, but different dimension dependence, under squared error loss.
We conclude (in Section 5) with some discussion, including a few avenues for future work. We
also present a table (Table 1) summarizing, for d-dimensional mean estimation problems, the effects
of the ambient dimension d, the required amount of privacy, and number of moments k assumed for
the distribution from which our data is drawn. This table illustrates the main consequences of the
results in this paper, allowing a more precise characterization of the tradeoffs between disclosure
risk and statistical performance.
Notation Throughout, we use the notation Q(· | x1:n) to denote the privatized output channel
of the statistician (defined in Section 2 below). We use subscripts x1:n to denote a sequence of
n observations x1, . . . , xn ∈ X . Throughout, xi, x1:n, x′i, x′1:n, etc, denote fixed value(s) in X ,
while Xi and X1:n represent random variable(s) taking values in X . We also use X to represent a
single random variable with the same distribution as X1, . . . ,Xn when the Xi are i.i.d. The metric
dham(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance between sets; we have dham(x1:n, x′1:n) ≤ 1 whenever x1:n
and x′1:n differ in only one entry. Given sequences an and bn, we use standard big-O notation, so
an = O(bn) means that an ≤ cbn for some constant c <∞ and for all suitably large n. The notation
an . bn means that an ≤ cbn for some constant c < ∞ and for all n ≥ 1, while an ≪ bn means
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that an/bn → 0 as n→∞. The function 1{·} is the indicator function, that is, for any event E , the
random variable 1{E} is equal to 1 if the event E occurs, and 0 otherwise. We let a∧ b = min{a, b}.
2 Definitions of privacy
We are interested in the setting where the adversary has access to all but one of the observations
in the sample: he knows that X1 = x1, . . . ,Xi−1 = xi−1,Xi+1 = xi+1, . . . ,Xn = xn, and seeks to
determine the last remaining observation Xi. We represent the statistician, or estimation procedure,
by a channel Q(· | ·), which, given a sample X1:n drawn from X n, releases a point θ ∈ Θ according to
the distribution Q(· | X1:n). Somewhat more formally, a channel is a regular conditional distribution
(or probability kernel) [e.g. 19, Chapter 5] from the sample space X n to the space Θ. We assume
that the data Xi are drawn i.i.d. according to some (unknown) distribution P with a parameter
θ(P ) we desire to estimate, and the goal of the statistician is to release θ that is as close as possible
to the unknown θ(P ) while guaranteeing that the adversary cannot identify any one observation
Xi. With our privacy goals in mind, we can consider two related frameworks for bounding the
information available to the adversary:
1. Likelihood/probability: Under the channel Q, for any region A ⊂ Θ of the output space, the
likelihood of A varies minimally for different possible values of Xi.
2. Hypothesis testing: If the adversary is considering two possible values xi and x
′
i for Xi, the
channel Q provides minimal power for testing these hypotheses against each other.
In the remainder of this section, we give our definitions of privacy, beginning with differential
privacy, then proceding to hypothesis-testing variants, and finally showing a variant of privacy that
protects against adaptive and posterior inferences (to be made precise) about the sample. We make
connections between all three via the hypothesis testing framework 2.
2.1 Differential privacy and its cousins
We begin our presentation of definitions with differential privacy, due to Dwork et al. [13].
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A channel Q is α-differentially private (α-DP) if for all x1:n
and x′1:n differing in only one observation,
Q(A | x1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
≤ exp(α) for all measurable A ⊂ Θ.
This condition essentially requires that, regardless of the output, the likelihood under Q does not
distinguish samples differing in only a small number of observations.
Many schemes for differential privacy actually obey a stronger smoothness property, and for
elucidation we thus define a more stringent version of privacy, which requires a bounded (semi)metric
ρpriv : X×X → R+ defined on the sample space X . Let ρpriv(x, x′) ≤ r for all x, x′ ∈ X (for example,
in a normed space with norm ‖·‖, we may take ρpriv(x, x′) = ‖x− x′‖ ∧ r). We then define the
metric dpriv : X n × X n → R+ by
dpriv(x1:n, x
′
1:n) :=
1
r
n∑
i=1
ρpriv(xi, x
′
i).
Notably, we have dpriv ≤ dham, and we thus define the stronger (more secure) version of differential
privacy we call smooth differential privacy :
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Definition 2 (Smooth differential privacy). The channel Q satisfies (ρpriv, α)-smooth differential
privacy if for all samples x1:n and x
′
1:n,
Q(A | x1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
≤ exp (αdpriv(x1:n, x′1:n)) for all measurable A ⊂ Θ. (1)
Both of these definitions are quite strong: they require a likelihood ratio bound to hold even for
an extremely low probability event A.
Example 1: Suppose that Xi ∈ [0, 1] for all i, and we release the mean corrupted by an
independent N(0, σ2/n) variable, that is, θ = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi +W , where W ∼ N(0, σ2/n). Then
the channel densities satisfy the ratios
exp
(
− |θ|
2σ2
− 1
2σ2
)
≤ q(θ | x1:n)
q(θ | x′1:n)
≤ exp
( |θ|
2σ2
+
1
σ2
)
,
which fails to be α-DP for any α, as we may have |θ| > σ2α. Yet the probability of releasing
such a large θ is exponentially small in n.
In this example, the probability of releasing a large θ—thus revealing information distinguishing
the samples X1:n and X
′
1:n—is negligible under both samples. Intuitively, these extremely low
probability events should not cause us to declare a channel non-private. Such situations motivated
Dwork et al. [12] to define a relaxed version of differential privacy disregarding low-probability
events:
Definition 3. A channel Q is (α, δ)-approximately differentially private ((α, δ)-DP) if, for all x1:n
and x′1:n differing in only one observation,
Q(A | x1:n) ≤ eα ·Q(A | x′1:n) + δ for all measurable A ⊂ Θ.
For approximate differential privacy, as in differential privacy, one typically thinks of α as a constant
(or decreasing polynomially to 0 as n→∞). To protect against catastrophic disclosures, one usually
assumes that δ decreases super-polynomially, though not exponentially, to zero, that is, that that
δ ≤ exp(−p(n)) where p(n) is a function satisfying log n≪ p(n)≪ n. While the relaxed conditions
of approximate differential privacy address situations such as Example 1, we show in Section 3 that
the consequences for estimation under each of the privacy definitions 1, 2, and 3 are quite similar.
2.2 Testing-based and divergence-based definitions of privacy
We now turn to alternate definitions of privacy, again considering an adversary who knows most
of the data in the sample, but we build on a framework of hypothesis testing. We believe these
variants both give some intuition for the definitions of disclosure limitation and suggest potential
weakenings of Definitions 1–3. Our first observation, essentially noted by Wasserman and Zhou [30,
Thm. 2.4] due to Oh and Viswanath [27], is that differential privacy is equivalent to a form of false
negative and false positive rate control for hypothesis tests that distinguish samples X1:n and X
′
1:n
differing in a single observation. In particular, let us assume that a test ψ : Θ → {0, 1} tries to
distinguish the following two hypotheses, where X1:n is known except for its ith entry:
H0 : X1:n = (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) and H1 : X1:n = (x1, . . . , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, . . . , xn).
Here a result of 0 from the test ψ indicates evidence that Xi = xi, while a 1 indicates evidence
instead that Xi = x
′
i. For shorthand let Q(· | Hj) denote the channel (private) distribution under
Hj. We have the following result; we provide a proof for completeness in Sec. A.1.
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Proposition 1. A channel Q satisfies (α, δ)-approximate differential privacy if and only if for all
hypothesis tests ψ mapping to {0, 1}, for any x1:n, x′1:n with dham(x1:n, x′1:n) ≤ 1,
Q(ψ = 1 | H0) + eα ·Q(ψ = 0 | H1) ≥ 1− δ, (2)
where we define hypotheses H0 : X1:n = x1:n and H1 : X1:n = x
′
1:n. Moreover, (α, δ)-approximate
differential privacy implies
Q(ψ = 1 | H0) +Q(ψ = 0 | H1) ≥ 2
1 + eα
− δ
1 + eα
≥ 1− α
2
− δ
2
. (3)
That is, for small α, the sum of the false positive rate and false negative rate, when testing H0
against H1, is nearly 1 under differential privacy (this is similarly true for approximate differential
privacy). This suggests a potential weakening of differential privacy: can we require that the
adversary cannot test H0 against H1 with any high power? That is, will we achieve sufficient
protection if we base privacy on mechanisms that achieve disclosure risk bounds of the form (3)?1
As a first approach, we note that Le Cam’s inequality [e.g. 29, Chapter 2.4] implies that for any
distributions P0 and P1, we have
inf
ψ
{P0(ψ 6= 0) + P1(ψ 6= 1)} = 1− ‖P0 − P1‖TV , (4)
where the infimum is taken over all measurable functions, and we recall that the total variation
distance is ‖P0 − P1‖TV = supA |P0(A)−P1(A)| = 12
∫ |dP0−dP1|. Based on Le Cam’s inequality (4)
and the consequence (3) of differential privacy, we arrive at the following proposal for privacy, which
bounds differences rather than ratios of likelihoods:
Definition 4. A channel Q is α-total variation private (α-TVP) if, for all x1:n and x
′
1:n differing in
only one observation, ∣∣Q(A | x1:n)−Q(A | x′1:n)∣∣ ≤ α for all A ⊂ Θ .
Equivalently, the error for testing x1:n against x
′
1:n has lower bound
inf
ψ
{
Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n) +Q(ψ = 0 | x′1:n)
} ≥ 1− α. (5)
Here the notation Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n) is shorthand for Q({θ : ψ(θ) = 1} | x1:n).
Notably, α-total variation privacy means that an adversary cannot accurately test between x1:n
and x′1:n. Comparing inequality (5) with inequality (3), we see that α-TV privacy is less stringent
than differential privacy. Unfortunately, while differential privacy may be strong, the testing-based
weakening (5) may not be fully satisfactory, as the following well-known example (e.g. [10]) shows:
Example 2 (“Release one at random”): Consider a channel Q that selects one observation at
random and releases it, so that Q(A | x1:n) = 1n
∑n
i=1 1{xi ∈ A}. Here the sample space and
output space are equal, X = Θ. When samples x1:n and x′1:n differ only at position i, then
|Q(A | x1:n)−Q(A | x′1:n)| ≤ 1n for any set A ⊂ X , so Q is α-TV private for any α ≥ 1/n.
While pathological, the constructed channel is clearly not private in an intuitive sense—one of the n
individuals in the sample will suffer a complete loss of privacy, even though initially each individual
had only a small chance of having his data revealed. Thus, simple hypothesis testing variants of
privacy, such as inequality (3) (and the equivalent total variation privacy of Definition 4) do not
1There is also a Bayesian interpretation of differential privacy [20] that says that an adversaries prior and posterior
beliefs after observing the output of Q cannot change much; we defer discussion to Section 5.
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provide sufficient protection against disclosure risk. One way to address this problem is to impose
stronger divergence requirements on the channels Q in Definition 4, for example, choosing a measure
between distributions that is infinite when they are not mutually absolutely continuous.
Before stating this extension of total-variation privacy, we recall that for a convex function
f : [0,∞] → R ∪ {+∞} satisfying f(1) = 0, the associated f -divergence between distributions P
and Q is defined as
Df (P ||Q) =
∫
f
(
dP
dQ
)
dQ =
∫
f
(
p
q
)
qdµ,
where µ denotes a measure with respect to which P and Q are absolutely continuous (with densities
p and q). For such a convex f , we define
Definition 5 (Divergence privacy). The channel Q is α-f -divergence private if
sup
{
Df
(
Q(· | x1:n)||Q(· | x′1:n)
) | dham(x1:n, x′1:n) ≤ 1} ≤ α.
We recover Definition 4 by taking f(t) = |t − 1|, we may take f(t) = t log t to obtain α-Kullback-
Leibler (α-KL) privacy (which is more stringent than TV-privacy by Pinsker’s inequality):
sup
{
Dkl
(
Q(· | x1:n)‖Q(· | x′1:n)
) | dham(x1:n, x′1:n) ≤ 1, xi ∈ X} ≤ α. (6)
We show in the sequel that mechanisms Q satisfying KL-privacy (and hence TV-privacy) can yield
more accurate estimates than approximately differentially private mechanisms. In contrast to these
two divergence-based definitions, however, differential privacy offers “privacy in hindsight,” where
even after the channel releases its output, each individual’s privacy is relatively secure.
2.3 Conditional hypothesis testing privacy
The “release-one-at-random” example highlights a need for stronger privacy requirements than hy-
pothesis testing privacy (or equivalently, total variation privacy). With this in mind, we turn to a
more restrictive notion of privacy based on hypothesis testing, where we assess the accuracy of a
hypothesis test ψ conditional on the output. This inspires an extension of our hypothesis testing
idea that conditions on the observed output of the channel.
To define this notion of conditional hypothesis testing, we require a few additional definitions.
We write PY to denote the set of all distributions on the space Y (treating the σ-algebra as implicit),
and given two spaces X and Y, we abuse notation and write Q : X n → PY to denote that Q is a
regular conditional probability for Y taking values in Y given X1:n ∈ X n, that is, Q(· | x1:n) is a
probability distribution on Y for each x1:n ∈ X n and is X n-measurable (a Markov kernel from X n
to Y). With this notation, we define channel composition as follows.
Definition 6 (Composition of channels). Given channels Q : X n → PY and Q′ : Y → PZ , the
composition of Q′ with Q, denoted Q′ ◦Q : X n → PZ is defined via the hierarchical model
Y | X1:n ∼ Q(· | X1:n) and Z | Y,X1:n ∼ Q′(· | Y ).
That is, we view Q′ as a stochastic kernel from the set Y to the set Z, where
(Q′ ◦Q)(A | x1:n) =
∫
y
Q′(A | y)dQ(y | x1:n).
With this definition of composition, we give a definition capturing when a channel communicates
less than another, which also provides a partial order on channels.
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Definition 7. Given channels Q : X n → PY and Q′ : X n → PZ , we say Q′ is less informative than
Q, written Q′  Q, if there exists a channel Q′′ : Y → PZ such that Q′ = Q′′ ◦Q.
The definition coincides with the notion of deficiency arising in the literature on statistical inference
and comparison of experiments, dating to Blackwell’s work in the 1950s (see, for example, Le Cam
and Yang [22, Chapter 2], or Liese and Vajda [24, Section VI]).
Definition 7 is natural: as we construct Q′ from Q via an independent randomization, no new
information about the sample X1:n arises by moving from Q to Q
′. Indeed, any channel Q′  Q
inherits privacy properties of Q; further processing cannot increase disclosure risk. More specifically,
we have an information processing inequality (cf. [24, 7, Chapter 2]; see Section A.2 for a proof).
Observation 1 (Information processing). If Q  Q′, then:
(1) If Q is α-f -divergence private (Definition 5) then Q′ is α-f -divergence private.
(2) If Q is (α, δ)-differentially private, then Q′ is (α, δ)-differentially private.
Using the notion of deficiency, we now provide a strengthened version of testing-based privacy.
Definition 8. A channel Q is (α, δ)-conditional hypothesis testing private (CHTP) if for any pair of
samples x1:n, x
′
1:n with dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1, any set A ⊂ Θ satisfying Q(A | x1:n)∧Q(A | x′1:n) ≥ δ,
and any test ψ : Y → {0, 1}, we have
Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n; θ ∈ A) +Q(ψ = 0 | x′1:n; θ ∈ A) ≥ 1− α, (7)
where the conditional channel is defined as
Q(B | x1:n; θ ∈ A) := Q(B ∩A | x1:n)
Q(A | x1:n) .
We make a few remarks on this definition. It says that the channel Q must have large probability of
error in testing between samples x1:n and x
′
1:n, even conditional on the output θ of the channel (at
least for θ in sets with high enough probability). The definition is nontrivial only for α < 1. Unlike
the notions of privacy introduced earlier (DP, TVP, and HTP), which are inherited (Observation 1),
CHTP is not inherited—there exist channels Q′  Q where Q is (α, δ)-CHTP while Q′ is not.
While expression (7) is superficially similar to our earlier testing-based definitions of privacy, its
reliance on the conditioning set A is important. It addresses the criticism of our original definition of
testing-based privacy (cf. Example 2), which only provides a priori protection. This new definition
says that even after observing the output of the channel Q, it is hard to test accurately between
samples x1:n and x
′
1:n differing in only a single entry; this posterior protection is more substantial.
Another way to interpret posterior privacy, as compared to a priori privacy, is that we would like
to limit the accuracy of hypothesis tests even when the hypotheses H0 and H1 and the test ψ are
constructed adaptively upon observing the output of the channel Q. To contrast with our earlier
definitions, recall Example 2 (“release-one-at-random”). Under the release-one channel, we have
little power a priori to test hypotheses H0 : Xi = xi and H1 : Xi = x
′
i against each other, since it is
unlikely (probability 1n) that the ith data point will be released. However, writing ireleased to denote
the index of the randomly released data point, we are able to test hypotheses about Xireleased with
perfect accuracy. Requiring conditional hypothesis testing privacy, on the other hand, accounts for
this issue and does not allow the “release-one-at-random” mechanism.
Interestingly, we can show that Definition 8 is essentially equivalent to (approximate) differential
privacy, once we account for the issue of “inheritance” of the CHTP property:
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Theorem 1. If Q is (α, δ)-DP, then it is (αCH, δCH)-CHTP where
αCH = (1 + e
−α) · (1− e−2α) ≤ 4α and δCH = (e2α − eα)−1δ ≤ α−1δ.
Conversely, suppose that for some αCH < 1 and δCH, Q
′ is (αCH, δCH)-CHTP for every Q′  Q.
Then Q is (α, δ)-DP with
α = 2 log
(
1 + αCH
1− αCH
)
≤ 4αCH
1− αCH and δ = δCH ·
1 + αCH
1− αCH .
See Appendix A.3 for a proof of this theorem.
We have thus come full circle: differential privacy appears to be a strong requirement, so the
simple a priori variants of testing-based privacy may seem more natural, requiring only that the
chances of discovering any particular person in a dataset are small. However, the “release-one-at-
random” example motivates us to move away from a priori privacy towards the posterior privacy
guaranteed by the new notion of conditional hypothesis testing—which is equivalent to differential
privacy.
3 Lower bounds on estimation of population quantities
Essential to any proposed definition of privacy or disclosure risk is an understanding of the fun-
damental consequences for inferential procedures and estimation. With that in mind, and having
provided several potential privacy definitions, we turn to an elucidation of some of their estimation-
theoretic consequences. In particular, we consider minimax risk, defined as follows. Let P denote
a family of distributions supported on a set X , and let θ : P → Θ denote a population quantity of
interest. We also require an error metric with which to measure the performance of an estimator;
to that end, we let ρ : Θ × Θ → R+ denote a (semi)metric on the space Θ, and let ℓ : R+ → R be
a loss function. For a fixed privacy-preserving channel Q, the maximum error for estimation of the
population parameter θ(P ) is
Mn(θ(P), Q, ℓ ◦ ρ) := sup
P∈P
EP,Q
[
ℓ(ρ(θ̂(X1:n), θ(P )))
]
, (8)
where the expectation is taken over both the sample X1:n and the estimator θ̂(X1:n). To be precise,
the data X1, . . . ,Xn are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution P , then the estimator θ̂(X1:n) is drawn
according to the channel Q(· | X1:n) conditional on X1:n.
We are interested in minimizing this error over all possible privacy-preserving mechanisms, so
that for a family Q (i.e. the set of channel distributions Q satisfying some chosen definition of
privacy), we study the minimax risk for estimation of the population parameter θ(P ), defined as
Mn(θ(P),Q, ℓ ◦ ρ) := inf
Q∈Q
Mn(θ(P), Q, ℓ ◦ ρ) = inf
Q∈Q
sup
P∈P
EP,Q
[
ℓ(ρ(θ̂(X1:n), θ(P )))
]
. (9)
As a concrete example, consider the problem of mean estimation over the space X = Rd. After
drawing the sample X1, . . . ,Xn i.i.d. P , we would like to estimate the mean of this distribution.
Consider the family P of all distributions P such that EP [‖X‖22] ≤ 1, and let θ(P ) = EP [X] ∈ Rd
be the mean of P (the parameter we wish to estimate). In this setting, we might use mean-squared
error, taking ℓ(t) = t2 and ρ(θ, θ′) = ‖θ − θ′‖2. The minimax risk is then
Mn(θ(P),Q, ℓ ◦ ρ) = inf
Q∈Q
sup
P :EP [‖X‖22]≤1
EP,Q
[∥∥∥θ̂(X1:n)− EP [X]∥∥∥2
2
]
.
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Our goal, for the remainder of this section, is to find lower bounds on this minimax error (both
for the mean estimation problem and the general setting) under each of the privacy frameworks in
the prequel. In Section 4, we derive upper bounds on the minimax error for mean estimation via
concrete constructions of private channels Q under the various frameworks.
Our approach A standard route for lower bounding the minimax risk (8) is to reduce the estima-
tion problem to a testing problem, where we aim to identify a point θ ∈ Θ from a finite collection
of well-separated points [32, 31]. Given an index set V of finite cardinality, the indexed family
of distributions {Pν , ν ∈ V} ⊂ P is said to be a 2δ-packing of Θ if ρ(θ(Pν), θ(Pν′)) ≥ 2δ for all
ν 6= ν ′ ∈ V.
In the standard hypothesis testing problem (without privacy constraints), nature chooses V ∈ V
uniformly at random, then (conditional on V = ν) draws a sample X1, . . . ,Xn i.i.d. from the
distribution Pν ; the problem is to identify the member V of the packing set V. Several techniques
exist for lower bounding the risk of this testing problem (see, for example, Yu [32], Tsybakov [29],
or Yang and Barron [31] for a survey of such techniques). In short, however, under the 2δ-packing
construction above, each begins with the classical reduction of estimation to testing that
Mn(θ(P), ℓ ◦ ρ) := inf
θ̂
sup
P∈P
EP [ℓ(ρ(θ̂(X1:n), θ(P )))] ≥ ℓ(δ) inf
ψ
P(ψ(X1:n) 6= V ),
where P denotes probability under the joint distribution of both V and the sample X1:n. In this
work, we have the additional complication that, instead of releasing a parameter θ̂ computed directly
on the sample X1:n, our estimator must satisfy some type of privacy—it is drawn from some channel
Q(· | ·). In particular, we immediately have the following extension of the classical lower testing-
based lower bound: for any 2δ-packing and family Q of channels,
Mn(θ(P),Q, ℓ ◦ ρ) ≥ ℓ(δ) inf
Q∈Q
inf
ψ
PQ
(
ψ(θ̂(X1:n)) 6= V
)
, (10)
where θ̂ is distributed according to Q(· | X1:n) and PQ denotes the joint distribution of the packing
index V , sample X1:n, and θ̂ drawn from Q. In the next sections, we show how to derive lower
bounds for this more complex problem.
3.1 Lower bounds for weak forms of privacy
We begin by focusing on private estimation under the weakest privacy setting we have defined: the
α-f -divergence privacy settings (recall Definitions 4 and 5). In particular, we prove all results in this
subsection using α-total variation privacy; this is, in a sense, the smallest f -divergence (cf. Liese
and Vajda [24, Section V], where it is shown that all f -divergences can be written as mixtures of
variation-like distances) and thus the weakest form of privacy. The lower bounds we prove here
extend immediately to all the definitions of privacy in this paper, as all the variants of differential
privacy (Definitions 1, 2, 3) and KL-divergence privacy (6) imply total variation privacy.
For a channel Q, the information available to an observer about the original distribution P of
the data is disguised via Q. To that end, for a channel Q and distribution Pν , we define the marginal
Mnν (A) :=
∫
Xn
Q(A | x1:n)dPnν (x1:n),
where Pnν is the n-fold product distribution (that is, X1:n ∼ Pnν is equivalent to X1, . . . ,Xn iid∼ Pν).
This is the marginal distribution of the privately released estimator θ̂ when the initial sample X1:n
is drawn from Pnν .
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Our first set of lower bounds builds on Le Cam’s two-point method (cf. [32]), which relates
minimax errors directly to a binary hypothesis test; in this case, the packing set consists only of the
distributions P0 and P1, each chosen with probability
1
2 . Let ψ : Θ → {0, 1} denote an arbitrary
testing procedure based on the output of the private mechanism Q. Then Le Cam’s method gives
the following lower bound (recall expression (4); see also [32, 29, Theorem 2.2]), where in the lemma
P denotes the joint distribution of the random variable V ∈ {0, 1}, the sample X1:n iid∼ Pν conditional
on V = ν, and the estimator θ̂ ∼ Q(· | X1:n).
Lemma 1 (Le Cam’s method). For the binary test described above, the probably of making an error
is lower bounded as
inf
ψ
P
(
ψ(θ̂) 6= V
)
=
1
2
− 1
2
‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV ,
where the infimum is taken over all testing procedures.
With this result in mind, if we can prove that the marginals Mν are substantially closer in
variation distance than are the Pν , we may obtain sharper minimax lower bounds on estimation. To
that end, we prove the following quantitative data processing inequality, which says that for small
privacy parameter α (i.e. a high privacy level), the output of the channel contains relatively little
information about the true distribution P . (See Sec. B.1 for a proof.)
Theorem 2. Let P0 and P1 be probability distributions on X and Pnν , ν ∈ {0, 1}, be their n-fold
products. Under α-total-variation privacy (definition 4),
‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV ≤ (2nα ‖P0 − P1‖TV) ∧ ‖Pn0 − Pn1 ‖TV .
We now give two applications of this contraction inequality to classical estimation problems.
3.1.1 Mean estimation under total variation privacy
As our first example, we consider estimation of a mean with mean-squared error as our metric,
studying a natural family of distributions for this setting. In particular, we consider families of
distributions with conditions on their moments that allow efficient estimation in non-private settings.
In particular, define the family Pdk (r) of distributions supported on Rd by
Pdk (r) :=
{
P | suppP ⊂ Rd and EP [‖X‖k2] ≤ rk
}
, (11)
that is, distributions on Rd with kth moment bounded by rk. For any k ≥ 2, the minimax mean-
squared error (9) for mean estimation in this family is bounded by r2/n when there are no privacy
constraints. Indeed, taking the sample mean as our estimator gives risk bounded as
E
[∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
Xi − E[X]
∥∥∥∥2
2
]
≤ 1
n
E[‖X − E[X]‖22] ≤
1
n
E[‖X‖22] ≤
1
n
E[‖X‖k2 ]
2
k ≤ r
2
n
.
However, after adding a privacy constraint, we have the following result, which is a consequence of
inequality (10), Lemma 1, and Theorem 2.
Proposition 2. Consider the problem of mean estimation over the class (11) of distributions. If
QTVα denotes the family of α-TV-private channels, then
Mn(θ(Pdk (r)),QTVα , | · |2) &
r2
n
+ r2
(
1
α2n2
) k−1
k
. (12)
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Proof. We apply Le Cam’s method and the lower bound (10). First, we fix δ > 0 (to be chosen
later), and we define the distributions P0 and P1 on {−rδ−1/k, 0, rδ−1/k} via
P0(X = −rδ−1/k) = δ, P1(X = rδ−1/k) = δ, and P0(X = 0) = P1(X = 0) = 1− δ.
Their respective means are θ0 = EP0 [X] = −rδ1−1/k and θ1 = rδ1−1/k, while ‖P0 − P1‖TV = δ
and E[|X|k] = rk(δ−1/k)kδ = rk. Via the estimation-to-testing bound (10), we have the following
minimax lower bound for any α-total variation private channel Q:
Mn(θ(P1k(r)), Q, | · |2) ≥
1
2
(
rδ1−1/k
)2
inf
ψ
{
PQ,P0
(
ψ(θ̂) 6= 0
)
+ PQ,P1
(
ψ(θ̂) 6= 1
)}
=
r2δ2−2/k
2
(1− ‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV)
≥ r
2δ2−2/k
2
(1− 2nα ‖P0 − P1‖TV) =
r2δ2−2/k
2
(1− 2nαδ) ,
where we have used the contraction inequality of Theorem 2. Choosing δ = 1/(4nα), we substitute
to find
Mn(θ(P1k(r)), Q, | · |2) ≥
r2δ2−2/k
4
=
r2
4 · 42−2/k
(
1
nα
) 2k−2
k
.
Our choice of Q was arbitrary, so once we note that the lower bound r2/n on minimax estimation
of a mean holds even in non-private settings, we obtain the lower bound.
Inequality (12) exhibits some interesting effects of privacy, even under such weak definitions as
total variation privacy. We might like to let α approach zero—meaning that the privacy guarantees
become stronger—as the sample size n grows. If the distribution is bounded, with ‖X‖2 ≤ r
always, then taking k =∞ is possible and the lower bound in (12) scales as r2/n+ r2/(n2α2). The
proposition then suggests (and we show later) that we can allow privacy at a level of α = 1/
√
n
without negatively affecting convergence rates. Under the weaker assumption that 2 < k < ∞,
however, the proposition disallows such quickly decreasing α; if α ≪ n 2−k2k−2 , there is a degradation
in rate of convergence. Moreover, if all we can guarantee is a second moment bound (k = 2), then
any amount of privacy α < 1 forces the rate to degrade, and it is impossible to take α → 0 as
n→∞ without suffering non-parametric rates of convergence.
3.1.2 Support estimation under total variation privacy
As our second example, we consider a support estimation problem, where the goal is to find the
support of a uniform distribution. In particular, we would like to find θ ∈ R+ when we know
that X ∼ Uni[0, θ]. In the private case, given a sample X1, . . . ,Xn iid∼ Uni[0, θ], a well-known
estimator is to use the first order statistic, X(1) = maxi{Xi}. This yields E[(X(1) − θ)2] . θ2/n2
(see, for example, the standard text of Lehmann and Casella [23]). Under even the weakest privacy
constraints, however, this rate is unattainable.
Proposition 3. Let QTVα denote the family of α-TV-private channels, and for t > 0 let Pt denote
the collection of uniform distributions Uni[0, θ] with θ ≤ t. Then in absolute value error,
Mn(θ(Pt),QTVα , | · |) ≥
1
32
t
nα
. (13)
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Note that by Jensen’s inequality, the lower bound (13) implies that
sup
θ≤t
1
t2
Eθ[(θ̂ − θ)2] ≥ sup
θ≤t
1
t2
Eθ[|θ̂ − θ|]2 & 1
n2α2
.
There is thus no possible privacy setting allowing estimation at the statistically efficient rate.
Proof. Fix δ ∈ [0, t] and consider the two distributions P0 = Uni[0, t − δ] and P1 = Uni[0, t]. Com-
paring their variation distances, we have ‖P1 − P2‖TV = δ/t. Moreover, their respective maxima
θ0 = t − δ and θ1 = t satisfy the separation condition |θ0 − θ1| = δ. Thus, by letting Mn denote
the marginal distribution of the released statistic, Le Cam’s method (Lemma 1) coupled with the
estimation-to-testing lower bound (10) implies
Mn(θ(Pt),QTVα , | · |) ≥
δ
4
(1− ‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV) .
By the contraction inequality of Theorem 2, we obtain the lower bound
E[|θ̂ − θ|] ≥ δ
4
(1− 2nα ‖P0 − P1‖TV) =
δ
4
(
1− 2nαδ
t
)
.
Choosing δ = t/(4nα) gives the result (13).
3.2 Lower bounds with variants of differential privacy
We now turn to lower bounds on estimation when the mechanism Q satisfies (a variant of) differential
privacy. We will see that this implies stronger lower bounds than those implied by α-total variation
privacy, as we obtain results that exhibit dependence on the ambient dimension d as well as on the
privacy parameter α. These lower bounds are based on a type of “uniformity of probability mass”
argument. Roughly, they are consequences of a guarantee that differentially private estimators θ̂
assign relatively high probability mass to all parts of the parameter space Θ as a consequence of
the likelihood ratio guarantee that is their definition.
As in the previous section, we have a (semi)metric ρ on the parameter space Θ, and a family
of distributions P, where V indexes a subset {Pν}ν∈V ⊂ P. Additionally, we assume there exists a
distribution P0 on the space X such that for some (fixed) p ∈ [0, 1], we have (1 − p)P0 + pPν ∈ P
for all ν ∈ V. With this fixed p in place, we may define the parameters we wish to estimate by
θν := θ
(
(1− p)P0 + pPν
)
,
where θ : P → Θ is our population statistic. (We omit p from our notation for θν, leaving it
implicit.) We then define the separation of the set {θν}ν∈V by
ρ∗(V) := min{ρ(θν , θν′) | ν, ν ′ ∈ V, ν 6= ν ′} . (14)
Now we come again to a standard testing problem: we choose a private procedure θ̂ (given by
a channel Q). After we make this choice, nature chooses one of the indices ν ∈ V, generating a
sample X1, . . . ,Xn drawn i.i.d. from the distribution (1− p)P0 + pPν . Our goal is then to estimate
the parameter θν = θ
(
(1 − p)P0 + pPν
)
accurately, which (essentially) corresponds to identifying
the index ν nature chooses. Under this setting, we can develop a result inspired by arguments
of Hardt and Talwar [16] and Beimel et al. [4]. In particular, we show that private mechanisms
necessarily are (non-trivially) likely to release parameters far away from the true parameter. In our
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case, however, we study population parameters rather than sample quantities (in contrast to Hardt
and Talwar [16]), approximate privacy, and use a more classical estimation framework rather than
PAC learning [4].
The following theorem (whose proof we give in Section B.2) is our main tool for proving concrete
lower lower bounds.
Theorem 3. Fix p ∈ [0, 1], and define Pθν = (1−p)P0+pPν ∈ P. Let θ̂ be an (α, δ)-approximately
differentially private estimator. Then
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
ρ(θ̂, θν) ≥ ρ∗(V)
)
≥
(|V| − 1) ·
(
1
2e
−α⌈np⌉ − δ 1−e−α⌈np⌉1−e−α
)
1 + (|V| − 1) · e−α⌈np⌉ .
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the consequences of this result via two examples,
the first on mean estimation and the second on non-parametric density estimation. Roughly, we
show that with appropriate choice of the mixture parameter p, Theorem 3 implies it is difficult to
distinguish between the distributions (1− p)P0+ pPν and (1− p)P0 + pPν′ , when ν 6= ν ′, as long as
the packing set V is large enough. In particular applications, we show how this implies substantial
dependence on the ambient dimension d of the parameter space.
3.2.1 Mean estimation under (approximate) differential privacy
For our first example, we provide a lower bound on convergence rates for mean estimation problems.
We begin by recalling the definition (11) of the set Pdk (r) as distributions P satisfying the non-central
moment condition E[‖X‖k2 ] ≤ rk (a similar result also holds under a central moment condition).
We have the following result.
Proposition 4. Let Qα,δ denote the family of (α, δ)-approximately differentially private channels.
Then for the mean estimation problem,
Mn
(
θ(Pdk (r)),Qα,δ , ‖·‖22
)
&
r2
n
+ r2min
{(
d2 ∧ log2 1δ
n2α2
) k−1
k
, 1
}
. (15)
It is interesting to study the scaling—the relationships between dimension d, privacy parameter
α, and sample size n—that Proposition 4 characterizes. Focusing on the α-differentially private
case with bounded random variables (i.e. k = +∞) we see that the minimax lower bound scales
as r2d2/(n2α2). In particular, the standard (non-private) rate of convergence in squared ℓ2-error
scales as r2/n, as discussed preceding Proposition 2. This radius term r implicitly encodes some
dimension dependence (consider, for example, a normal N(0, σ2Id×d) random variable, which satisfies
E[‖X‖22] = dσ2), so we see that there is substantial additional dimension dependence: to attain the
classical (non-private) rate of convergence, we must have n scaling at least as large as n ≥ d2/α2.
In general, for fixed α, δ, we see that the lower bound in (15) scales as r
2
n if and only if
n ≥
(
d2 ∧ log2 1δ
α2
) k−1
k−2
. (16)
We usually think of δ as decreasing quite quickly with n—as a simple example, as δ = e−
√
n with
α ≤ 1—so that the sample complexity bound (16) implies the optimal statistically efficient rate
is possible only if n ≥ (d2/α2)k−1k−2 . Thus, at least for suitably quickly decreasing δ, we observe a
quadratic-like penalty in convergence rate from the dimension.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let P0 be a point mass supported on {X = 0}, and for fixed p ∈ [0, 1] let Pν
be a point mass supported on {X = p−1/krν}, where ‖ν‖2 = 1. For any such p ∈ [0, 1], we claim that
the mixture Pθν := (1 − p)P0 + pPν lies in Pdk (r). Indeed, we have θ(Pθν ) = EPθν [X] = p1−1/krkν,
and
EPθν
[‖X‖k2 ] = p
∥∥∥p−1/krν∥∥∥k
2
= pp−1rk = rk.
Applying a standard volume-based result on the construction of packing sets (e.g. [1]), there
exists a set V ⊂ Rd of cardinality at least |V| ≥ 2d, with ‖ν‖2 ≤ 1 for all ν ∈ V and with
‖ν − ν ′‖2 ≥ 12 for all ν 6= ν ′ ∈ V. Because θ(Pθν ) = p1−1/krν, we have separation
ρ∗(V) ≥ rp1−1/k min
ν 6=ν′
∥∥ν − ν ′∥∥
2
≥ (r/2)p1−1/k.
Now, we apply the reduction of estimation to testing with this packing V, which implies
sup
P∈Pd
k
(r)
EP
[
‖θ̂ − θ(P )‖22
]
≥ 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
EPθν
[
‖θ̂ − θν‖22
]
≥ ρ∗(V)2 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
ρ(θ̂, θν) ≥ ρ∗(V)
)
.
Using Theorem 3, we thus obtain
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
EPθν
[
‖θ̂ − θν‖22
]
≥
(
rp1−1/k
2
)2
(|V| − 1) · (12e−α⌈np⌉ − δ1−e−α )
1 + (|V| − 1)e−α⌈np⌉
=
r2p2−2/k
4
· (2
d − 1) · (12e−α⌈np⌉ − δ1−e−α )
1 + (2d − 1)e−α⌈np⌉ .
We now choose p to (approximately) maximize the preceding display, which makes the average
probability of error constant. Without loss of generality, we may assume that d ≥ 2 (as Proposition 2
gives the result when d = 1), so that 2d − 1 ≥ ed/2. We choose
p =
1
nα
min
{
d
2
− α, log
(
1− e−α
4δeα
)}
. (17)
The second term in the minimum (17) is sufficiently small that
1
2
e−α⌈np⌉ − δ
1− e−α ≥
1
4
e−α(np+1) > 0,
and so we have
sup
P∈Pd
k
(r)
EP
[
‖θ̂ − θ(P )‖22
]
≥ r
2p2−2/k
4
·
1
4e
d/2e−α(np+1)
1 + ed/2e−α(np+1)
≥ r
2p2−2/k
4
· 1
8
,
where we have used that the first term in the minimum (17) implies that ed/2e−α(np+1) ≥ 1. For
the result (15), substitute the value (17) in the preceding display.
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3.2.2 Nonparametric density estimation under differential privacy
We now turn to a non-parametric problem, showing how Theorem 3 provides lower bounds in this
case as well. Interestingly, we again obtain a result that suggests a penalty from privacy that scales
quadratically in (an analogue of) the dimension and inversely in n2α2, as we saw in the preceding
example. In this case, however, the dimension is implictly chosen to make the problem challenging.
Formally, let P denote the family of distributions supported on [0, 1]d with densities f that are 1-
Lipschitz continuous (with respect to the ℓ2-norm on R
d). We assume we observe X1, . . . ,Xn
iid∼ P ,
and we wish to estimate the density f from which the sample is drawn; we use ℓ22 error as our loss,
so that given an estimate f̂ , we measure error via ‖f̂ − f‖22 =
∫ 1
0 (f(t)− f̂(t))2dt.
In this case, we obtain the following result; we prove the result only in the case of α-differentially
private channels (δ = 0) for simplicity. (See Section B.3 for the proof.)
Proposition 5. Let Qα denote the family of α-differentially private channels. Then for a constant
cd > 0 that may depend on the dimension d,
Mn(P,Qα, ‖·‖22) ≥ cd
[
1
n
2
2+d
+
1
(nα)
2
1+d
]
. (18)
The bound (18) is matched by known upper bounds. The n−2/(2+d) term in the bound is the well-
known minimax rate for estimation of a Lipschitz density on [0, 1]d; a standard histogram estimator
achieves this convergence rate (see, for example, Yang and Barron [31] or Tsybakov [29]). To attain
the latter part of the lower bound, we recall Wasserman and Zhou [30, Theorem 4.4]. Making
the immediate extension of their results to d dimensions, we note that Wasserman and Zhou show
that constructing a standard histogram estimator with k equally sized bins on [0, 1]d, then adding
independent Laplace noise (of appropriate magnitude dependent on α and k) to each of the bins,
and returning this histogram, gives an estimator f̂hist that is α-differentially private and satisfies
E
[
‖f̂hist − f‖22
]
.
k
n
+
1
k
2
d
+
k2
n2α2
. (19)
The first two terms are the standard bias-variance tradeoff in density estimation (e.g. [29, 8, Chapter
3]), while the last k2/n2α2 term is reminiscent of the bounds (15) in its additional quadratic penalty.
Choosing k = min{n1/(d+2), (nα)1/(d+1)} in expression (19) gives the bound (18).
We make one more remark on Proposition 5. Though our observations Xi are bounded, as
are the densities we estimate, we may not take the privacy parameter α to 0 as quickly as in the
parametric problems in the preceding section. Indeed, if α = o(n−
1
2+d ) as n → ∞, expression (18)
shows it is impossible to attain the non-private rate. In contrast, in expression (15), we see that
(assuming k = +∞) as long as α≫ n−1/2, as n→∞ we attain the classical parametric rate.
4 A few upper bounds for mean estimation
Having provided lower bounds on several (population) estimation problems, we now focus on guar-
antees for convergence. We focus for concreteness on mean estimation tasks under the moment
assumption (11), as we wish to most simply illustrate a few of the consequences of imposing pri-
vacy on estimators of population quantities. Our goal is thus to estimate the mean θ = E[X] of
a distribution P ∈ Pdk (r), that is, distributions supported on Rd satisfying the moment condition
E[‖X‖k2 ] ≤ rk for some k ≥ 2.
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We first define our estimator, which is similar to estimators in some of our earlier work [9]. For
v ∈ Rd, let πT (v) denote the projection of the vector v onto the ℓ2-ball of radius T . Now, let
W ∈ Rd be a random vector (whose distribution we specify presently); our private estimator is
θ̂ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
πT (Xi) +W. (20)
The estimator (20) is a type of robustified estimator of location where outlying estimates are trun-
cated to be within a ball of radius T ; similar ideas for estimation of parameters have been used by
Smith [28] and are frequent in robust statistical estimation [18]. By specific choices of W and T ,
however, we can achieve order optimal rates of convergence for our private estimators.
We consider three distributions for W that variously satisfy our privacy definitions. Before
giving them, we note that if we define v = 1n
∑n
i=1 πT (xi) and v
′ = 1n
∑n
i=1 πT (x
′
i), then it is clear
that∥∥v − v′∥∥
2
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
∥∥πT (xi)− πT (x′i)∥∥2 ≤ 1n
n∑
i=1
∥∥xi − x′i∥∥2 ∧ 2T ≤ 2Tn card{i : xi 6= x′i} . (21)
A mechanism for KL-divergence-based privacy Let us first consider the divergence-based
variants of privacy, focusing on α-KL privacy (6). In this case, take W ∼ N(0, 2T 2n2αKL Id×d). Letting
Q denote the distribution of θ̂, for samples x1:n and x
′
1:n differing in at most a single observation
we have
Dkl
(
Q(· | x1:n)‖Q(· | x′1:n)
)
= Dkl
(
N
(
v,
2T 2
n2αKL
)
‖N
(
v′,
2T 2
n2αKL
))
=
n2αKL
4T 2
∥∥v − v′∥∥2
2
≤ n
2αKL
4T 2
4T 2
n2
= αKL,
because ‖v − v′‖2 ≤ 2T/n. Therefore, this estimator achieves KL-privacy as desired.
A mechanism for approximate differential privacy Turning now to the variants of dif-
ferential privacy, we note that the Hamming-Lipschitz guarantee (21) implies that if we take
W ∼ N(0, 2T
2 log 1
δ
n2α2
Id×d), then the estimator θ̂ is (α, δ)-approximately differentially private (see,
for example, Dwork et al. [12] or Hall [14, Section 1.3.2]).
A mechanism for smooth differential privacy Finally, we show how to satisfy the strongest
variant of privacy, smooth differential privacy (Definition 2). In particular, using the metric
ρpriv(x, x
′) = ‖x− x′‖2 ∧ 2T and dpriv(x1:n, x′1:n) = 12T
∑n
i=1 ρpriv(xi, x
′
i), we claim that taking
W to have independent coordinates, each Laplace distributed with density p(w) ∝ exp(−κ|w|),
where κ = αn/2T
√
d, satisfies smooth differential privacy. Indeed, we have that the ratio of the
densities∣∣∣∣log q(z | x1:n)q(z | x′1:n)
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ αn2T√d ‖v − z‖1 − αn2T√d ∥∥v′ − z∥∥1
∣∣∣∣
≤ αn
2T
∥∥v − v′∥∥
2
≤ αn
n
1
2T
n∑
i=1
∥∥xi − x′i∥∥2 ∧ 2T = α · dpriv(x1:n, x′1:n),
where the final inequality uses the bound (21). In particular, this additive Laplace noise mechanism
satisfies smooth differential privacy and, by extension, differential privacy.
16
With these three mechanisms in place, we have the following proposition, whose proof we provide
in Section C.
Proposition 6. Consider the estimator (20). The following hold.
(i) Choose T = r(n2αKL/d)
1/(2k) and let W ∼ N(0, 2T 2n2αKL Id×d). Then θ̂ is αKL-KL private, and
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] .
r2
n
+ r2
(
d
n2αKL
) k−1
k
.
(ii) Choose T = r(n2α2/(d log 1δ ))
1/(2k) and letW ∼ N(0, 2T
2 log 1
δ
n2α2 Id×d). Then θ̂ is (α, δ)-approximately
differentially private, and
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] .
r2
n
+ r2
(
d log 1δ
n2α2
) k−1
k
.
(iii) Choose T = r(nα/d)1/k and let W have independent Laplace(αn/(2T
√
d))-distributed coordi-
nates. Then θ̂ is α-differentially private and (ρpriv, α)-smoothly differentially private (Def. 2)
with metric ρpriv(x, x
′) = ‖x− x′‖2 ∧ 2T , and
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] .
r2
n
+ r2
(
d2
n2α2
) k−1
k
.
Proposition 6 shows that many of the lower bounds we have provided on population estimators in
Section 3 are tight. We summarize each of the convergence guarantees in Table 1, which shows upper
and lower bounds on estimation of a population mean that we have derived. (Note that by Pinsker’s
inequality [7], 2 ‖P0 − P1‖2TV ≤ Dkl (P0‖P1), so that lower bounds for α-total variation privacy imply
lower bounds for
√
αKL-KL privacy, and convergence guarantees for αKL-KL private estimators give
convergence guarantees for α2-TV private estimation.) While our bounds for αKL-KL and α-TV
private estimators are not sharp—we are missing a factor of the dimension d between upper and lower
bounds—we see that divergence-based privacy allows substantially better convergence guarantees
as a function of the dimension as compared with differential privacy. However, it does not permit
better scaling with the moments k of the problem; all privacy guarantees suffer as the number k of
moments available shrinks. Moreover, Proposition 6, when coupled with the lower bounds provided
by Proposition 4, shows that there is (essentially) no difference in estimation rates between smooth
differential privacy and differential privacy. In a sense, it is possible to provide even stronger
guarantees than differential privacy without suffering in performance.
5 Summary and open questions
In this paper, we have provided a variety of definitions and formalisms for privacy, as well as
reviewing definitions already present in the literature. We showed that testing-based definitions of
privacy, which provide a priori protection against disclosures of sensitive data, have some similarities
with differential privacy and related notions of privacy. On the other hand, differential privacy
provides posterior guarantees of privacy and testing, and is in fact equivalent to variants of testing-
based notions of privacy that provide protection against inferences conditional on the output of the
private procedure.
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Privacy type Upper bound Lower bound
No privacy constraint
1
n
1
n
α-differential (Def. 1)
(
d2
n2α2
)k−1
k
+
1
n
(
d2
n2α2
) k−1
k
+
1
n
(‖·‖2 , α)-smooth (Def. 2)
(
d2
n2α2
)k−1
k
+
1
n
(
d2
n2α2
) k−1
k
+
1
n
(α, δ)-approximate (Def. 3)
(
d log 1δ
n2α2
) k−1
k
+
1
n
(
d2 ∧ log2 1δ
n2α2
) k−1
k
+
1
n
α-TV (Def. 5)
(
d
n2α2
)k−1
k
+
1
n
(
1
n2α2
) k−1
k
+
1
n
Table 1. Our known upper and lower bounds on the minimax risk for estimation of the mean of
a distribution, given n i.i.d. observations from a distribution P on X ⊂ Rd, where P satisfies the
moment condition E[‖X‖k
2
] ≤ 1. The minimax risk is measured in squared ℓ2-error.
To complement the definitional study we provide, we also investigated consequences of our def-
initions for different estimation tasks for population quantities. We identified a separation between
estimating means under (smooth) differential, approximate differential, and the divergence-based (a
priori testing) versions of privacy, as exhibited by Table 1. It is clear that there are many open ques-
tions remaining: first, our results are not all sharp, as our upper and lower bounds match precisely
only for the strongest variants of privacy. Perhaps more interestingly, the weakest (testing-based)
definitions of total variation privacy is unsatisfactory (recall the “release-one-at-random” scenario in
Example 2), but perhaps other divergences (Definition 5) provide satisfactory privacy protection.
Such schemes allow substantially better estimation than differential privacy constraints, as shown
in Table 1, and may provide adequate assurances of privacy in scenarios with a weaker adversary.
We believe that future work on alternate definitions of privacy, which consider weaker adversaries
(see Bassily et al. [2]), should be fruitful. For example, differential privacy is equivalent to guarantees
that an adversary’s posterior beliefs on the presence or absence of a data point x in a sample X1:n
cannot be too different from his prior beliefs—no matter the adversary’s prior [20]. Can restrictions
on an adversary’s prior beliefs, as studied by Bassily et al. [2], allow more accurate estimation? We
believe any proposal for privacy definitions should also include an exploration of the fundamental
limits of inferential procedures, as without such an understanding, it is difficult to balance statistical
utility and disclosure risk. We hope that the techniques and insights we have developed here provide
groundwork for such future study into the tradeoffs between privacy guarantees and estimation
accuracy.
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A Proofs related to privacy definitions
In this section, we collect proofs of the equivalence between our various notions of privacy as well
as a few consequences of our different definitions.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by proving that inequality (2) is equivalent to α-differential privacy. Indeed, let A ⊂ Θ
be an arbitrary set and let ψ(θ) := 1{θ ∈ A}. Then if inequality (2) holds, we have
eαQ(A | H0) + (1−Q(A | H1)) ≥ 1− δ, or eαQ(A | H0) + δ ≥ Q(A | H1),
and similarly we have
(1−Q(Ac | H0)) + eαQ(Ac | H1) ≥ 1− δ, so eαQ(Ac | H1) + δ ≥ Q(Ac | H0).
Since A was arbitrary, the channel Q satisfies Definition 1. The other direction is trivial.
Now we demonstrate inequality (3). Applying (2) twice, we have
Q(ψ = 1 | H0) + eα ·Q(ψ = 0 | H1) ≥ 1− δ and Q(ψ = 0 | H1) + eα ·Q(ψ = 1 | H0) ≥ 1− δ
(where the second version holds by swapping x1:n with x
′
1:n, and replacing ψ with 1 − ψ, then
applying (2)). Adding these two inequalities together, we obtain
(eα + 1) · (Q(ψ = 1 | H0) +Q(ψ = 0 | H1)) ≥ 2− δ,
proving the first inequality in (3). The second statement of the inequality follows because 21+eα ≥
1− α2 for all α ≥ 0.
A.2 Proof of Observation 1
The first statement of the observation is immediate because of the data processing inequality for
f -divergences (see, e.g. Liese and Vajda [24, Theorem 14]): we are guaranteed that for any samples
x1:n and x
′
1:n in X n,
Df
(
Q′(· | x1:n)||Q′(· | x′1:n)
) ≤ Df (Q(· | x1:n)||Q(· | x′1:n))
by the Markovian construction of Q′ from Q, that is, Q′ = Q′′ ◦Q for some Q′′ by Definition 7.
For the second observation, take two samples x1:n, x
′
1:n with dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1. We use the fact
that E[W ] =
∫∞
0 P{W ≥ t}dt for any non-negative random variable W . We have that Q′ = Q′′ ◦Q
for some Q′′, so
Q′(A | x1:n) = EY∼Q(·|x1:n)[Q′′(A | Y )] =
∫ 1
0
PY∼Q(·|x1:n)
{
Q′′(A | Y ) ≥ t} dt
=
∫ 1
0
Q
({y : Q′′(A | y) ≥ t} | x1:n) dt.
Applying the same reasoning to the sample x′1:n, and using the fact that Q is (α, δ)-differentially
private, we then have
Q′(A | x′1:n) =
∫ 1
0
Q
({y : Q′′(A | y) ≥ t} | x′1:n) dt
≤
∫ 1
0
[
eαQ
({y : Q′′(A | y) ≥ t} | x1:n)+ δ] dt = eαQ′(A | x1:n) + δ.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
We split the proof into the two statements: differential privacy implies conditional hypothesis testing
privacy, and conditional hypothesis testing privacy (for Q and for all less informative channels
Q′  Q) implies differential privacy.
A.3.1 Differential privacy implies conditional hypothesis testing privacy
We need to show that for any samples x1:n and x
′
1:n differing in at most one observation and
measurable sets A ⊂ Y satisfying Q(A | x1:n) ∧Q(A | x′1:n) ≥ δCH,
Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n, Y ∈ A) +Q(ψ = 0 | x′1:n, Y ∈ A) ≥ 1− αCH.
We assume that Q(A | x′1:n) ≥ (e2α − eα)−1δ, as otherwise CHTP is satisfied regardless.
Let B = ψ−1({1}) ⊂ Y be the acceptance region for the test ψ. Then by Bayes’ rule and
differential privacy, we have
Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n, Y ∈ A) +Q(ψ = 0 | x′1:n, Y ∈ A) =
Q(A ∩B | x1:n)
Q(A | x1:n) +
Q(A ∩Bc | x′1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
≥ e
−α(Q(A ∩B | x′1:n)− δ)
eαQ(A | x′1:n) + δ
+
Q(A ∩Bc | x′1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
(i)
≥ e
−α(Q(A ∩B | x′1:n)− δ)
e2αQ(A | x′1:n)
+
Q(A ∩Bc | x′1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
,
where inequality (i) follows from the assumption that Q(A | x′1:n) ≥ δCH = (e2α − eα)−1δ. Adding
the fractions in the previous display, we obtain
Q(ψ = 1 | x1:n, Y ∈ A) +Q(ψ = 0 | x′1:n, Y ∈ A)
≥ e
−3α ·Q(A ∩B | x′1:n) +Q(A ∩Bc | x′1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
− e
−3αδ
Q(A | x′1:n)
≥ e−3αQ(A ∩B | x
′
1:n) +Q(A ∩Bc | x′1:n)
Q(A | x′1:n)
− e
−3αδ
(e2α − eα)−1δ
= e−3α − (e2α − eα)e−3α = e−3α + e−2α − e−α = 1− αCH,
where the second inequality follows again by assumption that Q(A | x′1:n) ≥ δCH.
A.3.2 CHTP implies DP
First, solving for αCH and δCH in the statement of the theorem, we have
αCH =
e
α
2 − 1
e
α
2 + 1
and δCH = δ · e−
α
2 .
We need to show that Q is (α, δ)-differentially private, as long as for any Q˜  Q, and for any
samples x1:n and x
′
1:n with dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1, we have
Q˜(ψ = 1 | x1:n, ;Z ∈ A˜) + Q˜(ψ = 0 | x′1:n;Z ∈ A˜) ≥ 1− αCH
for any set A˜ ⊂ Z with Q˜(A˜ | x1:n) ∧ Q˜(A˜ | x′1:n) ≥ δCH. (22)
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For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that Q is not (α, δ)-differentially private, and so
there is a set B and two samples x1:n and x
′
1:n with dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1 such that
Q(B | x1:n) > eαQ(B | x′1:n) + δ. (23)
In particular, we will show that if there is a set B satisfying inequality (23), then the upper
bound (22) fails to hold. Let C = Bc be the complement of B. Set the thresholds
tB := 1 ∧ Q(C | x
′
1:n)
Q(B | x1:n) and tC := 1 ∧
Q(B | x1:n)
Q(C | x′1:n)
.
Let the channel Q˜ be defined by Q˜(· | X) = Q(· | X) × Uni[0, 1], that is, the output of Q˜
conditional on X is the pair (Y,U), where Y ∼ Q(· | X) and U is an independent uniform random
variable. In this case, we have the relation Q˜  Q, so that Q˜ must satisfy inequality (22) for any
test ψ and samples x1:n and x
′
1:n satisfying dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1. If we define the Cartesian products
B˜ := B × [0, tB ] and C˜ := C × [0, e−
α
2 tC ],
we also obtain the following pair of inequalities:
Q˜(B˜ | x1:n) = tBQ(B | x1:n)
By (23)
> eαtBQ(B | x′1:n) + tBδ = eαQ˜(B˜ | x′1:n) + tBδ
≥ eαQ˜(B˜ | x′1:n)
(24a)
and
Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n) = e−
α
2 tCQ(C | x′1:n) > e−
α
2 tCQ(C | x1:n) = Q˜(C˜ | x1:n), (24b)
where the strict inequality above follows from assumption (23), as Q(C | x1:n) < Q(C | x′1:n).
Moreover, we have the string of equalities
Q˜(B˜ | x1:n) =
(
1 ∧ Q(C | x
′
1:n)
Q(B | x1:n)
)
Q(B | x1:n) = Q(C | x1:n) ∧Q(C | x′1:n) (25)
=
(
1 ∧ Q(B | x1:n)
Q(C | x′1:n)
)
Q(C | x′1:n) = e
α
2 Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n).
With the strict inequalities (24) and equation (25), we can derive our desired contradiction to
the testing upper bound (22), which we prove by conditioning on Z ∈ A˜ := B˜ ∪ C˜. First, we must
check that Q˜(A˜ | x1:n) ∧ Q˜(A˜ | x′1:n) ≥ δCH. Indeed, since A˜ = B˜ ∪ C˜, we have
Q˜(A˜ | x1:n) ∧ Q˜(A˜ | x′1:n) ≥ Q˜(B˜ | x1:n) ∧ Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n) = e−
α
2
(
Q(B | x1:n) ∧Q(C | x′1:n)
)
by Eq. (25). By assumption (23), we know that Q(B | x1:n) > δ = eα2 δCH, and inequality (23)
implies 1−Q(C | x1:n) > eα(1−Q(C | x′1:n)) + δ, and so
Q(C | x′1:n) > e−α(eα − 1) + e−αδ + e−αQ(C | x1:n) ≥ δ = e
α
2 δCH.
Therefore, the bound Q˜(A˜ | x1:n) ∧ Q˜(A˜ | x′1:n) ≥ δCH holds, and we turn to contradicting the
inequality (22), that is,
Q˜(ψ = 1 | x1:n;Z ∈ A˜) + Q˜(ψ = 0 | x′1:n;Z ∈ A˜) ≥ 1− αCH.
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To that end, we choose a particular test: let ψ(y) = 1{y ∈ C˜}. Then by Bayes’ rule and the fact
that B˜ and C˜ are disjoint, we obtain
Q˜(ψ = 1 | x1:n;Z ∈ A˜) = Q˜(C˜ | x1:n)
Q˜(B˜ | x1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x1:n)
(i)
<
Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
Q˜(B˜ | x1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
(ii)
=
Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
e
α
2 Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
=
1
e
α
2 + 1
.
where step (i) follows by inequality (24b) and step (ii) follows from Eq. (25). To lower bound the
second probability in the testing upper bound (22), we have
Q˜(ψ = 0 | x′1:n;Z ∈ A˜) =
Q˜(B˜ | x′1:n)
Q˜(B˜ | x′1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
(i)
<
e−αQ˜(B˜ | x1:n)
e−αQ˜(B˜ | x1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
(ii)
=
e−
α
2wtQ(C˜ | x′1:n)
e−
α
2 Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n) + Q˜(C˜ | x′1:n)
=
1
e
α
2 + 1
,
where we have used inequality (24a) for step (i) and Eq. (25) again for step (ii). Combining the two
preceding displays, we obtain
Q˜(ψ = 0 | x1:n;Z ∈ A˜) + Q˜(ψ = 1 | x′1:n;Z ∈ A˜) <
2
e
α
2 + 1
= 1− e
α
2 − 1
e
α
2 + 1
= 1− αCH,
where we have recalled the definition of αCH. This contradicts the testing bound (22).
B Proofs of Minimax Lower Bounds
In this section, we collect proofs of each of our minimax lower bounds and their related results.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we prove a slightly more general form of Theorem 2. Let P0,i and P1,i, i = 1, . . . , n
be probability distributions on X , and let Pnν be their n-fold products for ν = 0, 1 (that is, we draw
independent, but not necessarily identically distributed, observations X1 ∼ Pν,1, . . . , Xn ∼ Pν,n).
Under α-total-variation privacy (Def. 4), we will prove that
‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV ≤ 2α
n∑
i=1
‖P0,i − P1,i‖TV . (26)
For the special case that Pν,i = Pν for all i = 1, . . . , n (for each ν = 0, 1), this proves that
‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV ≤ 2nα ‖P0 − P1‖TV .
The inequality ‖Mn0 −Mn1 ‖TV ≤ ‖Pn0 − Pn1 ‖TV is immediate from the classical data processing
inequality (cf. [24, Theorem 14]), so proving inequality (26) is sufficient to prove the theorem.
Now we turn to the proof of (26). By the product nature of Pnν (x1:n) for each ν = 0, 1, we have
dPn0 (x1:n)− dPn1 (x1:n) =
n∑
i=1
dP i−11 (x1:i−1)(dP0,i(xi)− dP1,i(xi))dPn−i0 (xi+1:n).
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For any set A ∈ σ(Z), we thus have
|Mn0 (A)−Mn1 (A)| =
∣∣∣∣ ∫Xn Q(A | x1:n)dPn0 (x1:n)− dPn1 (x1:n)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
∫
Xn
Q(A | x1:n)dP i−11 (x1:i−1)(dP0,i(xi)− dP1,i(xi))dPn−i0 (xi+1:n)
∣∣∣∣,
and writing x\i := {x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn},
≤
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ ∫Xn (Q(A | x1:n)−Q(A | x\i, x′i)) dP i−11 (x1:i−1)(dP0,i(xi)− dP1,i(xi))dPn−i0 (xi+1:n)
∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
sup
x1:n,x′1:n
|Q(A | x1:n)−Q(A | x′1:n)|
∫
Xn
dP i−11 (x1:i−1)|dP0,i(xi)− dP1,i(xi)|dPn−i0 (xi+1:n),
where the supremum is taken over samples with dham(x1:n, x
′
1:n) ≤ 1. By our privacy assumption,
we have
sup
x1:n,x′1:n
|Q(A | x1:n)−Q(A | x′1:n)| ≤ sup
x1:n,x′1:n
∥∥Q(· | x1:n)−Q(· | x′1:n)∥∥TV ≤ α,
and since
∫ |dP0,i − dP1,i| = 2 ‖P0,i − P1,i‖TV, this completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We begin the proof of Theorem 3 by stating a lemma that shows, roughly, that a set A with high
probability under a distribution Pθν must also have high probability under Pθν′ , so long as the
estimator θ̂ is α-differentially private. We recall the definition of Pθν = (1− p)P0 + pPν (where the
sample size n is implicit).
Lemma 2. Let A be a measurable set, and ν, ν ′ ∈ V. Assume that Pθν ∈ P for all ν. Then if θ̂ is
(α, δ)-approximately differentially private,
Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A) ≥ e−α⌈np⌉
[
Pθν′ (θ̂ ∈ A)−
1
2
]
− δ1− e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α . (27)
Deferring the proof of Lemma 2, we now show how it leads to a short proof of Theorem 3. Let
Bǫ(θ) = {θ′ ∈ Θ : ρ(θ, θ′) ≤ ǫ}. Then by assumption on ρ∗(V), the balls Bρ∗(V)(θν) are disjoint for
all ν. Now, for an estimator θ̂, let the average probability of success be
Psucc :=
1
|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
θ̂ ∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν)
)
. (28)
Then we have
Psucc = 1− 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
θ̂ 6∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν)
)
≤ 1− 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
θ̂ ∈
⋃
ν′∈V ,ν′ 6=ν
Bρ∗(V)(θν′)
)
= 1− 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
∑
ν′∈V ,ν′ 6=ν
Pθν
(
θ̂ ∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν′)
)
,
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where the inequality follows from the disjointness of the balls Bρ∗(V)(θν). Using Lemma 2, we can
lower bound the probability Pθν (θ̂ ∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν′)), whence we find that
Psucc
(27)
≤ 1− 1|V|
∑
ν∈V
∑
ν′∈V ,ν′ 6=ν
[
e−α⌈np⌉
(
Pθν′
(
θ̂ ∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν′)
)
− 1
2
)
− δ1− e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
]
= 1− e−α⌈np⌉ (|V| − 1)|V|
∑
ν∈V
Pθν
(
θ̂ ∈ Bρ∗(V)(θν)
)
+ e−α⌈np⌉
|V| − 1
2
+ (|V| − 1)δ1 − e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
= 1 + (|V| − 1)
[
e−α⌈np⌉
2
+ δ
1− e−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
]
− e−α⌈np⌉(|V| − 1)Psucc,
where we have used the definition (28) of Psucc. Rearranging terms, we obtain
Psucc ≤
1 + (|V| − 1) ·
(
1
2e
−α⌈np⌉ + δ 1−e
−α⌈np⌉
1−e−α
)
1 + (|V| − 1) · e−α⌈np⌉ .
Lower bounding 1− Psucc gives the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2 Let B = {Bi}ni=1 be sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables.
Now, assume that observations are generated according to the following distribution: first, draw
W 01 , . . . ,W
0
n
iid∼ P0 and draw W ν1 , . . . ,W νn iid∼ Pν . Then for each i, if Bi = 0, set Xi = W 0i , while if
Bi = 1, setXi = W
ν
i . By inspection, we have that observations are marginally drawn i.i.d. according
to the mixture Pθν = (1 − p)P0 + pPν . Additionally, for fixed ν ′ ∈ V, generate an alternate sample
by drawing W ν
′
i
iid∼ Pν′ and setting
X ′i = W
0
i · (1−Bi) +W ν
′
i ·Bi
for each i. By construction, we observe that
dham(X1:n,X
′
1:n) ≤ B⊤1.
By definition of (α, δ)-approximate differential privacy, we have for any fixed sequence b ∈ {0, 1}n
that
Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = W 0i · (1− bi) +W νi · bi for each i ∈ [n])
≥ e−αb⊤1Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = W 0i · (1− bi) +W ν
′
i · bi for each i ∈ [n])−
b⊤1−1∑
i=0
δe−αi
= e−αb
⊤
1Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = W 0i · (1− bi) +W ν
′
i · bi for each i ∈ [n])− δ
1− e−αb⊤1
1− e−α . (29)
By construction, we have
Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A) =
∑
b∈{0,1}n
P (B = b)Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A | B = b)
=
∑
b∈{0,1}n
P (B = b)
∫
Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = w0i · (1− bi) + wνi · bi for i ∈ [n])dPn0 (w01:n)dPnν (wν1:n)
24
Removing some terms in the summation corresponding to b⊤1 ≤ ⌈np⌉ and integrating over the
additional variables wν
′
i , we obtain
Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A)
≥
∑
b∈{0,1}n
b⊤1≤⌈np⌉
P (B = b)
∫
Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = w0i · (1− bi) + wνi · bi for i ∈ [n])dPn0 (w01:n)dPnν (wν1:n)
=
∑
b∈{0,1}n
b⊤1≤⌈np⌉
P (B = b)
∫
Q(θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = w0i · (1− bi) + wνi · bi for i ∈ [n])dPn0 (w01:n)dPnν (wν1:n)dPnν′(wν
′
1:n).
Applying the approximate differential privacy lower bound (29), we obtain the further lower bound
Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A) ≥
∑
b∈{0,1}n
b⊤1≤⌈np⌉
P (B = b)
∫ [
e−α⌈np⌉Q
(
θ̂ ∈ A | Xi = w0i · (1− bi) + wν
′
i · bi for i ∈ [n]
)
. . .
− δ1 − e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
]
dPn0 (w
0
1:n)dP
n
ν (w
ν
1:n)dP
n
ν′(w
ν′
1:n)
=
∑
b∈{0,1}n
b⊤1≤⌈np⌉
P (B = b)
(
e−α⌈np⌉Pθν′ (θ̂ ∈ A | B = b)− δ
1 − e−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
)
≥ e−α⌈np⌉Pθν′ (θ̂ ∈ A,B⊤1 ≤ ⌈np⌉)− δ
1− e−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α
≥ e−α⌈np⌉
(
Pθν′ (θ̂ ∈ A)− P (B⊤1 > ⌈np⌉)
)
− δ1 − e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α ,
the last inequality following from a union bound. The median of the Binomial(n, p) distribution is
no larger than ⌈np⌉, so we obtain
Pθν (θ̂ ∈ A) ≥ e−α⌈np⌉
(
Pθν′ (θ̂ ∈ A)−
1
2
)
− δ1 − e
−α⌈np⌉
1− e−α .
for any set A.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The first term in the bound (18) is a standard result in nonparametric density estimation; see, for
example, Tsybakov [29, Theorem 2.8], Devroye and Györfi [8, Chapter 4], or Yang and Barron [31,
Section 6]. We thus focus on the second term in the lower bound (18).
Let P0 be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
d, with density f ≡ 1. Standard results in approxima-
tion theory and density estimation (see, for example, the Devroye and Györfi [8, Chapter 4], Yang
and Barron [31], or Lorentz [25, Section 5]) show the following result: the packing entropy for the
collection of 1-Lipschitz densities on [0, 1]d scales as (1/ǫ)d. More concretely, there exist constants
c0, c1 > 0 (that may depend on the dimension d) such that for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a collection
{fν}ν∈V of densities fν , where each density fν is 1-Lipschitz continuous, ‖fν − fν′‖2 ≥ c0ǫ, the set
V has cardinality
log |V| ≥ c1 1
ǫd
, and fν(x) ∈ [1− ǫ, 1 + ǫ] for x ∈ [0, 1]d. (30)
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Now, choose p ∈ (0, 1], and set ǫ = p in the construction leading to the inequalities (30). Then
the density 1+ (1/p)(fν − 1) is a valid density and is (1/p)-Lipschitz. If Pν denotes the distribution
with this density, then we have (1 − p)P0 + pPν ∈ P, and moreover, the mixture (1 − p)P0 + pPν
has density (1 − p) + p[1p(fν − 1) + 1] = fν. In particular, we have the separation (for the metric
ρ(f, g) = ‖f − g‖2)
ρ∗(V) ≥ c0p.
We now apply Theorem 3, setting δ = 0 as we are working with differential privacy. Letting fP
denote the density associated with the distribution P , we obtain that for any α-differentially private
estimator f̂ based on n observations and any p ∈ [0, 1] that
sup
P∈P
E
[
‖f̂ − fP ‖22
]
≥ ρ∗(V)2
 12
(
ec1(
1
p
)d − 1
)
e−α⌈np⌉
1 + (e
c1(
1
p
)d − 1)e−α⌈np⌉

≥ c20 p2 ·
e
c1(
1
p
)d−α⌈np⌉ − e−α⌈np⌉
1 + ec1(
1
p
)d−α⌈np⌉ − e−α⌈np⌉
.
By choosing p = min{12 (nα/c1)−
1
d+1 , 1} we obtain
c20 p
2 e
c1(
1
p
)d−α⌈np⌉ − e−α⌈np⌉
1 + ec1(
1
p
)d−α⌈np⌉ − e−α⌈np⌉
≥ 1
(nα)
2
d+1
· c20 · cd,
where cd is a constant that may depend on d. This gives the desired result (18).
C Proof of Proposition 6
We begin our proof by presenting two lemmas, the first of which gives a bound on the bias of our
estimator, the second showing that the variance of random vectors projected onto convex sets is
always smaller than the initial variance.
Lemma 3. Let X be an arbitrary random vector with E[‖X‖k2] < ∞ for some k > 1. Then there
exists a vector v ∈ Rd satisfying ‖v‖2 ≤ E[‖X‖k2 ]/((k − 1)T k−1) such that E[πT (X)] = E[X] + v.
Proof. It is clear that E[πT (X)] = E[X]+E[πT (X)−X], and ‖E[πT (X)−X]‖2 ≤ E[‖πT (X)−X‖2].
But ‖X − πT (X)‖2 ≤ ‖X‖2 · 1{‖X‖2 > T}, and consequently for any k > 1 we have
E[‖πT (X)−X‖2] ≤ E[‖X‖2·1{‖X‖2 ≥ T}] =
∫ ∞
T
P(‖X‖2 ≥ t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
T
E[‖X‖k2 ]
tk
dt =
E[‖X‖k2]
(k − 1)T k−1 ,
where the second inequality follows from Markov’s inequality.
Lemma 4. Let X be an Rd-valued random variable and let ΠC(x) denote the (Euclidean) projection
of a point x ∈ Rd onto a closed convex set C. Then E[‖ΠC(X)− E[ΠC(X)]‖22] ≤ E[‖X − E[X]‖22].
Proof. Let X ′ be an i.i.d. copy of X. Then, since E[X] = E[X ′], we have
E[
∥∥X −X ′∥∥2
2
] = E[
∥∥X − E[X] + E[X ′]−X ′∥∥2
2
]
= E[‖X − E[X]‖22] + E[
∥∥X ′ − E[X ′]∥∥2
2
]− 2E[〈X − E[X],X ′ − E[X ′]〉]
= E[‖X − E[X]‖22] + E[
∥∥X ′ − E[X ′]∥∥2
2
]
= 2E[‖X − E[X]‖22],
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where each step follows from the fact that X and X ′ are i.i.d. Similarly, we also have
E[
∥∥ΠC(X)−ΠC(X ′)∥∥22] = 2E[‖ΠC(X) − E[ΠC(X)]‖22].
The projection ΠC is non-expansive [17, Chapter III.3], so E[‖ΠC(X)−ΠC(X ′)‖22] ≤ E[‖X −X ′‖22],
proving the lemma.
With Lemmas 3 and 4 in place, we can now give a convergence guarantee for the estimator (20) of
the parameter θ = E[X]. Indeed, by the two lemmas, we see that via a bias-variance decomposition
E[‖θ̂ − θ‖22] = E
[∥∥∥(E[πT (X)]− E[X]) + 1
n
n∑
i=1
(πT (Xi)− E[πT (X)]) +W
∥∥∥2
2
]
= ‖E[πT (X)]− E[X]‖22 +
1
n
E[‖πT (X)− E[πT (X)]‖22] + E[‖W‖22]
≤ E[‖X‖
k
2 ]
2
(k − 1)2T 2k−2 +
r2
n
+ E[‖W‖22], (31)
where we have used Lemmas 3 and 4 and the fact that Var(X) ≤ E[‖X‖22] ≤ r2 by assumption.
Now, for each of the privacy types, we evaluate the risk of the resulting estimator when we
perturb the mean of the truncated variables by W . We begin with α-KL privacy (equation (6)). In
this case, we take W ∼ N
(
0, T
2
n2αKL
Id×d
)
, and using the decomposition (31), the rate of convergence
is bounded by
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] ≤
r2
n
+
r2k
(k − 1)2T 2k−2 +
T 2d
n2αKL
.
Setting T = (n2αKL/d)
1/(2k) to approximately minimize the preceding expression, we obtain that
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] .
r2
n
+ r2
(
d
n2αKL
) k−1
k
.
To obtain the results for (α, δ)-approximate differential privacy and α-differential privacy, we
sample W from a N(0,
T 2 log 1
δ
n2α2
Id×d) distribution, which yields (α, δ)-approximate differential privacy
as noted previously, and that
E[‖θ̂ − E[X]‖22] ≤
r2
n
+
r2k
(k − 1)2T 2k−2 +
T 2d log 1δ
n2α2
.
Choosing T = (n2α2/(d log δ−1))1/(2k) gives the second result of the proposition.
For the final result, we note that for a vector W ∈ Rd with independent coordinates with
densities p(w) ∝ exp(−κ|w|), where κ = αn/T
√
d, satisfies
E[‖W‖22] = 2
d∑
j=1
T 2d
α2n2
= 2
d2T 2
n2α2
,
so that as before, choosing T = (n2α2/d2)1/(2k) gives the final result.
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